Napoleon and the campaign of 1814
By Houssaye Henry
Napoleon, 48,000, had the Army of Silesia, say 100,000, Blücher… trapped….
Without going to pretend with Koch, that by the capitulation of Soissons Blücher created a similar situation to that in which he found himself at Lübeck in 1806, we believe we have sufficiently demonstrated that the position would have been, if not desperate, at very least compromised if Moreau, instead of cowardly opening the gates of the town, had dared to face an assault, had risked a resistance he could prolong for twenty-four or thirty-six hours, a resistance that would have likely resulted in the lifting of the siege on the 4th in the morning, even if before signing this shameful capitulation, he had thought to blow up the stone bridge. The anger and indignation of the Emperor were all the more legitimate, as he had no delusion on the overwhelming effect that would not fail to be produced on public opinion everywhere, in Paris as well as the headquarters of the Allies, on the news of the fall Soissons.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814